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RECENT CASES
CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY FOR
DISCRIMINATORY ACTS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER

THE MISSOURI DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES ACT
Industrial Linens Supply Co., Inc. v.
Missouri Commission on Human Rights'

On September 5, 1972, Kevin Jones, a Black, visited the Columbia,
Missouri Job Center seeking employment. While Jones was present at the
center, Truman Kay, route supervisor for Industrial Linens Supply Co. in
Columbia phoned the center and requested an applicant for a truck route
delivery salesman opening. Kay was informed that there was an applicant
at the center's office who would be referred to Kay immediately. When
Jones presented himself to Kay, he was informed that the position had just
been filled. Jones filed a complaint with the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights under Chapter 296 of the Missouri Revised Statutes-the
Missouri Discriminatory Employment Practices Act.2 The Commission held
Industrial Linens responsible for the actions of its employee and found
that the company had denied employment to Jones because of his race.
The Commission ordered Industrial Linens to place Jones at the top of its
hiring list and awarded Jones back pay. The Circuit Court of Cole County
reversed and the Commission appealed. The Missouri Court of Appeals,
Kansas City District, held Industrial Linens liable for the discriminatory
acts of its route supervisor and remanded the case to the Commission to
consider Jones' qualifications for the position and to reconsider the type of
relief which should be granted.'
The Missouri Discriminatory Employment Practices Act is similar to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in that it affords a remedy to
persons denied employment opportunities because of race, creed, color,
1. 539 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
2. Ch. 296, RSMo 1969.
3. The court in IndustrialLinens stated that the Missouri statute provides that
back pay can be awarded only if the claimant under the statute is a former employee; it cannot be awarded where a claimant was denied employment by a Missouri
employer. 539 S.W.2d at 646. This interpretation varies from actions under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), in which back pay can
be awarded whether or not the complainant is a former employee.
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religion, national origin, sex, or ancestry.4 The Missouri statute applies to
any person who employs six or more persons within the state and its
provisions can be activated by the actions of employers or persons "acting
in the interest of an employer directly."5
Employer responsibility for actions of employees that violate Title VII
has been predicated on several theories. A few of the Title VII cases
expressly adopt a regular agency theory by applying the definition of
"agency" to the facts of the particular case.' Under this theory the usual
defenses to employer responsibility for employees could be asserted. However, most of the cases under Title VII, while not expressly accepting or
rejecting agency concepts, apply different tests in determining employer
responsibility depending upon whether the employee who is discriminating is a supervisor or is a lower level employee. The Missouri court in Industrial
Linens expressly rejected the application of "apparent agency" and "respondeat superior" tests to actions under the Missouri statute and stated
that, in determining employer responsibility for actions of employees that
violate the statute, an "employer is prima facie liable for the acts of its
employee done in the course of his duties . . ...7 The Missouri court did not

recognize a supervisor-employee distinction.
The cases and EEOC decisions8 under Title VII that address employer
responsibility for discrimination by supervisors adopt three different approaches. One line of cases holds the employer strictly liable for discrimination by supervisors, at least where such supervisor could be classified as a
member of "upper management." 9 It is not clear from the decisions what
type of employee would be considered upper management. A person in
the management hierarchy with authority to hire, fire, or promote should
4. § 296.020(1), RSMo (Supp. 1976).
5. § 296.010(2), RSMo (Supp. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 5588
(1973); Discharge for Associating with Negroes is Racial Discrimination, [1973]
Equal Empl. Opp. Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4328 (1970). The district court in Chastang
applied the definition of "agent" which appears in C.J.S.:
[One who, by the authority of another, undertakes to transact some
business or manage some affairs on account of such other, and to render
an account of it. He is a substitute [sic] or deputy [sic] appointed by his
principal primarily to bring about business relations between the latter and
third persons.
6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 5595 n.19.
7. 539 S.W.2d at 644 (emphasis added).
8. "EEOC" is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which is the
administrative body responsible for hearing complaints under Title VII.
9. See, e.g., Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp. Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th
Cir. 1972); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala.
1973), modified on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); Vesting Veto Power
over Promotions in Foremen Creates Vehicle for Discrimination, [1973] Equal
Empl. Opp. Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4371 (1971). The district court in United States
Steel Corp. said, "[i]t is easy enough to hold that policies established by the work's
General Superintendent are those oF'of the company."' 371 F. Supp. at 1054.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/5
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certainly be deemed a member of upper management. Under this theory
of employer responsibility, there are no defenses available to shield the
10
employer from the statutory remedies provided to a wronged employee.
The Missouri court's "in the course of duties" test does not hold the
employer strictly liable for the actions of supervisors because certain defenses are available to the employer regardless
of the wrongdoing employ1
ee's position in the management hierarchy.
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.12 adopted a different theory of employer
responsibility under Title VII, and decided that the employer would be
liable for the supervisor's wrongful conduct only if the employer somehow
"gained" from the supervisor's actions. 3 The district court in Come held
the employer was not responsible for the discriminatory actions of the
supervisor because the employer in no way gained from the supervisor's
sexual advances toward female employees.
The third approach taken by the decisions under Title VII is that the
employer will only be liable for the actions of the supervisor when he is
acting in his capacity as supervisor (hiring, firing, promoting, etc.). 4 Two
defenses are available to the employer. Several decisions by the EEOC have
asserted that the employer will not be responsible for the supervisor's
discrimination where the employer takes steps to remedy the situation after
the employer learns of the supervisor's conduct. 5 One decision indicated
that a possible defense of the employer could be that the supervisor was
disciplined for his discriminatory conduct. 6 Although it did not adopt the
approach of the Title VII decisions on employer responsibility, the Missouri court in Industrial Linens mentioned the failure of Industrial Linens
to discipline its route supervisor as a factor in its decision to impute the
10. Title VII allows a successful claimant to recover back pay, attorney's fees,
and possibly other damages resulting from the discrimination. See Walker, Title
VII: Complaint and Enforcement Proceedingsand Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. INDUS. &

COM. L.

REV.

495 (1966).

11. The Missouri court indicated the employer may avoid responsibility by
expressly instructing his employees not to discriminate. 539 S.W.2d at 644.
12. 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7461 (1975).
13. Id. at 7463.
14. See, e.g., Failure to Discipline Employer's Officials for Civil Rights Violations Constitutes Unfair Employment Practice. [1973] Equal Empl. Opp. Comm'n
Dec. (CCH) 4041 (1969); Vesting Veto Power over Promotions in Foremen Creates
Vehicle for Discrimination, [1973] Equal Empl. Opp. Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4371
(1971).
15. In a 1969 EEOC decision, the Commission stated "that where an employer
promptly undertakes measures calculated to remedy the complained of violation of
Title VII, we will not impute a supervisor's unauthorized conduct to the employer."
Disciplinary Suspension Because of Race Not Proved, [19731 Equal Empl. Opp.
Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4118, 4119 (1969). See also Supervisor's Unauthorized Conduct Constituting Possible Sex Bias Not Imputed to Employer, [1973] Equal Empl.
Opp. Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4229 (1970).
16. Failure to Discipline Employer's Officials for Civil Rights Violations Constitutes Unfair Employment Practice, [1973] Equal Empl. Opp. Comm'n Dec.
(CCH) 4041 (1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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It is not clear what weight

that factor carried in the ultimate decision.
The Title VII cases that deal with employer responsibility for discrimination by low level employees hold the employer liable on two different
theories. The first bases the employer's liability on his knowledge of discriminatory conduct and his failure to take steps to stop it.18 This places an
affirmative duty on the employer to end discrimination only after he has
knowledge that discrimination is occurring. Thus, it is a defense to the
employer that he was unaware that the unlawful conduct was occurring.
One decision by the EEOC went further and imposed liability on an
employer where he had reason to believe that racial discrimination was
occurring although he did not have actual knowledge of the discrimination. 19
The second theory upon which employers are held responsible for low
level employees' discrimination is that the employer has failed to enforce a
policy of non-discrimination.2" This imposes an affirmative duty on the
employer to see that discrimination is not occurring. The absence of knowledge of unlawful conduct is no defense.
A possible rationale for the supervisor-employee distinction is that the
potential for harm from discrimination by these two groups is different.
Employers are held more responsible for the actions of supervisors because
discrimination by a supervisor can result in a complete denial of employment while discrimination by employees only results in an unpleasant working environment.
Several New York cases have discussed employer responsibility for
discrimination by employees under state civil rights statutes. None of these
decisions recognized a supervisor-employee distinction. Hubert v. Jose2
held that the employer would not be responsible for employee actions
where the employee was acting contrary to the employer's orders and
17. The Missouri court said that "even after the complaint was filed in the
case, Kay [the employee] received no reprimand or any other disciplinary action."
539 S.W.2d at 645.

18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec.

(CCH) 6944 (1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972); Subjecting Worker to Racial

Insults and Subsequently Terminating Him is Unlawful, [1973] Equal Empl. Opp.
Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4056 (1969); Permitting Harassment of Employee Because of
His National Origin Constitutes Unlawful Discrimination, [1973] Equal Empl. Opp.

Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4131 (1969).
19. Management is Required to Insure that Nondiscrimination Policy is Ob-

served by Employees, [1973] Equal Empl. Opp. Comm'n Dec. (CCH) 4033 (1969).
20. Id. See also United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045

(N.D. Ala. 1973), modified on othergrounds, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), where the

district court said: "[W]hen such [discriminatory] actions are contrary to established
policy of the company, a policy which upper management attempts to enforce
within means reasonably available, these should not, it seems, be taken as company
action. . . ." Id. at 1054.
21. 148 App. Div. 718, 132 N.Y.S. 811 (1912).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/5
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without the employer's knowledge. Jackson v. Imburgia22 stated that the
employer would not be responsible for employee discrimination where the
employer had in good faith instructed the employees not to discriminate.
There was no requirement that the employer be unaware of the discrimination. Hobson v. York Studios23 only required that the employer instruct
employees not to discriminate in order to avoid liability. The warning did
not have to be in good faith as in Jackson, nor did the employer have to be
unaware of the discrimination as in Hubert. In none of these decisions is
there an affirmative obligation on the part of the employer to see that
discrimination is not occurring as there is under some of the Title VII
cases.24 The Missouri court in Industrial Linens cited with approval these
New York decisions. The court adopted the Hobson approach and stated
that it would be a defense to the employer that there were "express
instructions not to discriminate. ' 25 The Missouri court imposed no good
faith requirement on those instructions, imposed no lack of knowledge
requirement, and imposed no affirmative duty on the employer to see that
discrimination is not occurring.
Application of the test adopted by the court in Industrial Linens will
reach the same result as the supervisor-employee decisions under Title VII
when the supervisor is discriminating in his hiring, firing, and promoting
activities. Under the Missouri test the employer will be held responsible for
such actions because they are in the course of the supervisor's duty. However, the employer probably would not be held liable under the test of
Industrial Linens when a low level employee is discriminating against or
harassing a fellow employee, because the employee is not within the course
of his duties while engaged in such conduct. The Title VII decisions would
hold the employer liable for such actions if the employer knew of such
employee conduct2 6 or2 7failed to take steps to insure a discrimination-free
working environment.
In lieu of this gap in liability, the Missouri courts should adopt a
different approach to employer responsibility for employee actions that
violate the Missouri statute. The Title VII supervisor-employee distinction
should be recognized in Missouri, but employer liability should be extended even further than the federal Title VII decisions. Stricter liability will
encourage greater efforts to comply with the statutory requirements. The
employer should be held strictly accountable for the actions of his supervisors when they are acting in their capacity as supervisors. It should be a
defense to the employer that the supervisor was acting personally only if
the employer has taken reasonable steps to insure that such "personal"
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

184 Misc. 1063, 55 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1945).
208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1955).
See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
539 S.W.2d at 644.
See cases cited note 18 and accompanying text supra.
See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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